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trade flows are but one, limited, aspect of economic links 
between countries. This applies also to Norwegian–US eco-
nomic relations: sales from affiliates are larger, in many cases 
much larger, than cross-border trade. This holds true for goods 
and services alike, and in both directions – from the USA to 
Norway, and the converse. 
Because of geographical distance and more limited trade inte-
gration, the share of the USA in Norway’s foreign economic 
links is much smaller than that of the EU. As shown in Table 1, 
the US share ranges from 4–5% for trade in goods to 8–11% for 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), with services in-between. Even 
though the USA is one of Norway’s large trade and investment 
partners, its role is dwarfed by that of the EU, who accounts for 
shares of Norway’s trade and FDI of between 53% and 82%.
                  
2.2.  Tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) facing  
Norwegian exporters in the EU and the USA
Standard Most Favoured Nations (MFN) tariffs in the EU and 
the USA are low and on average about 3%. Whereas Norway 
has no separate trade agreement with the USA and therefore 
faces MFN tariffs, it is deeply integrated with the EU through 
the European Economic Area (EEA) Treaty, which ensures 
tariff exemption on most goods.
NTBs are the result of various trade-related regulations such 
as quantity restrictions, price control, health and safety regu-
lations, standards, and testing requirements. Several studies 
have attempted to calculate the trade-restricting effects of 
NTBs (tariff equivalents). In general these are much greater 
than tariffs for both the EU and the USA. Kee et al. (2009), for 
example, find NTB tariff equivalents of about 11.4 and 7.5%, in 
the two markets respectively. However, for Norwegian exports 
to the EU, these are probably considerably lower, due to the 
EEA Treaty, whereby goods are to receive mutual recognition, 
and many standards, rules and regulations are harmonised.
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1. Introduction
The EU and the USA are currently involved in ambitious 
negotiations over a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership (TTIP). The aim is to reach a comprehensive agree-
ment that focuses not only on tariff reductions, but also on 
reductions in regulatory barriers to trade (Non-Tariff Barriers, 
or NTBs) through mutual recognition and harmonisation of 
standards, rules and laws. The agreement is intended to 
cover trade in goods and services, in addition to investments. 
Bilateral trade between the EU and the USA constitutes only 
3.8% of world trade. However, if realised, TTIP will be the 
world’s largest preferential trade agreement in terms of the 
partners’ economic significance: the EU and the USA account 
for about half of global GDP and 44% of world trade in 
goods.2 One declared goal is that TTIP should set guidelines 
for the partners’ future negotiations on trade and invest-
ments with other countries. Thus, the agreement may result 
in rules and standards that others will have to follow, and 
the consequences for third countries may prove significant. 
In several third countries that are already deeply integrated 
with the EU, like Norway, Switzerland and Turkey, stakehold-
ers have demanded that their country seek association with 
the TTIP in some form or another. One possible form of asso-
ciation could be separate agreements with the USA. 
2. Norway’s economic relations with the EU and the USA
2.1. Trade and capital flows
After several decades with international investment growing 
faster than trade, it is important to recall that cross-border 
1  To a large extent this brief builds on NUPI and Norstella (2014, in Norwegian).
2 Figures are nominal values for year 2010 and based on own calculations 
using data from COMTRADE (trade) and World Development Indicators, CIA 
World Factbook and national statistical sources (GDP statistics).
Summary
The possible realisation of a Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the USA may 
have significant impacts, also for third countries. This policy 
brief analyses the economic consequences and possibilities 
for one third country – Norway – discussing both TTIP and a 
separate agreement on trade and investments between Nor-
way and the USA. 
Type of activity
FDI (Foreign Direct Investment)
Trade in goods
Trade in services
Outward
Inward 
Exports
Imports
Exports
Imports
Year
2012
2012
2013
2013
2013
2013
USA (%)
11
8
4
5
8
7
EU (%)
61
70
82
65
53
65
Data source: Statistics Norway
Table 1. Shares of the USA and the EU in Norway’s foreign economic activity 
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Although Norway enjoys free market access to the EU for 
most goods, EU NTBs and tariffs are important for Norwegian 
exports, since they grant preferences to Norwegian exporters 
as compared to non-EEA exporters. 
Whereas the TTIP is expected to lead to the near-total elimi-
nation of all tariffs, many NTBs cannot be removed, as they 
may relate to safety measures, national preferences, or politi-
cally sensitive areas.  Ecorys (2009) estimates that about half 
of the NTBs between the EU and the USA are ‘actionable’ in 
the sense that removing them is possible and desirable. 
3. Effects from TTIP 
Trade agreements may have positive and negative effects 
for third countries. Negative trade diversion effects occur 
because reduced barriers to trade between the EU and the 
USA lead them to trade more with each other and less with 
others. In section 3.1 we provide quantitative estimates of 
diversion effects for Norwegian goods export resulting from 
TTIP. Diversion may also occur for investments and trade in 
services if TTIP results in reduced barriers in these areas, but 
we have not been able to quantify such effects.
Diversion of trade in goods is often stronger from tariff reduc-
tions than from reductions in NTBs, because the latter may also 
have positive spillover effects: mutual recognition or harmoni-
sation of rules and standards between the EU and the USA can 
make it easier also for third countries to export to these two. 
Third countries may also benefit from increased demand 
for goods, services and investments in the EU and the USA. 
There are several reasons for this: TTIP may lead to economic 
growth in the two, production activities are increasingly frag-
mented across national borders, and FDI and services trade 
in several sectors are complementary to trade in goods. Nor-
way, for instance, would probably experience an increase in 
demand for maritime transport services – its most important 
exported service to the USA.
3.1.  Effects on Norwegian export of goods – a diversion 
analysis 
Here we present estimates of reductions in Norwegian goods 
export to the EU and the USA resulting from trade diversion due 
to TTIP. The calculations are crude and based on several assump-
tions. They should therefore be interpreted with caution and are 
best suited for qualitatively ranking the products that will be 
most affected. Two scenarios are considered: (i) elimination of 
all tariffs, and (ii) elimination of all tariffs and 50% reductions 
in NTBs.  
Table 2 displays the results from scenario (ii) , showing the 
effects for total exports and for the products with the greatest 
losses (in absolute values). We estimate Norwegian exports to the 
EU and the USA combined to be reduced by about USD 110 mil-
lion (2012 value). This is a small effect, constituting only 0.1% 
of Norwegian export to the two, and 0.08 % of total Norwegian 
export.   In relative terms, the effect is greater as regards the USA 
than the EU, and some products are more heavily affected. For 
the USA, these include seafood, chemical products, transport 
equipment, fats and machines; for the EU, the effect is greatest 
for seafood.
Comparison of the two scenarios shows that tariff elimination is 
the most important source of decline in Norwegian exports to the 
EU, accounting for as much as 94% of the total effect in scenario 
(ii). For USA the converse is true: here tariffs account for only 24%. 
However, for certain important goods like fats and machines, 
tariffs dominate here as well. For the EU and the USA combined, 
tariff eliminations account for slightly less than 60% of the total 
effect. This shows how even low average tariffs may have signifi-
cant effects on exports. They may conceal high rates on certain 
goods. Moreover, small tariff reductions may have sizable impacts 
on exports of certain products if demand is highly price-sensitive. 
3.2. Effects on Norwegian GDP – earlier studies
The analysis in the previous section was only partial. More com-
prehensive studies take into account effects on imports as well 
as exports, trade in services, spillovers from NTB reductions, 
and other general equilibrium effects. CEPR (2013) and IFO 
(2013) are two important studies like that. Although the main 
focus is on the EU and the USA, they also calculate effects for 
third countries. Different modelling approaches are used.  The 
IFO study uses a gravity model where effects from tariff reduc-
tions are calculated directly. For NTB reductions, it uses the 
model to estimate the effects of current Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) and assumes that the effects from TTIP will be similar. 
By contrast, the CEPR study uses a computable general equilib-
rium (CGE) model together with estimates for NTB tariff equiva-
lents, and calculates the effects from reductions in both tariffs 
and NTBs directly. This makes it possible to take into account 
any positive spillover effects for third countries from NTB reduc-
tions. The IFO study takes spillovers into account only to the 
extent that they have come about through other FTAs. However, 
because TTIP is intended to cover such a large economic area, it 
may induce a convergence towards global rules and standards, 
which implies that spillovers will be more prevalent than under 
other FTAs. Spillovers would probably also be particularly 
important for Norway, as several rules and standards negotiated 
in TTIP are likely to be applicable there, due to the EEA Treaty.
Table 3 shows the percentage change in GDP due to TTIP as 
predicted in the two studies. Note that while Norway appears 
as a separate country in IFO (2013), it is lumped together with 
three other countries in CEPR (2013), so figures reported there 
are for the group. Predictions diverge considerably. The CEPR 
study predicts small positive effects for Norway, due mainly 
to positive spillover effects; whereas the IFO study predicts a 
fall in Norwegian GDP of almost 4% as well as an increase in 
unemployment of 0.44 percentage points (not presented here). 
Furthermore, Table 3 shows that the main effects from TTIP will 
come from reductions in NTBs, not tariffs. This somewhat con-
tradicts the results from the diversion analysis in the previous 
section, which showed that the major part of the overall effect 
was due to tariff reductions.4  
Export to
EU
USA
EU+USA
Animal 
products* 
49 444 (0.80)
20 475 (7.06)
69 919 (1.09)
Export of
Chemicals
  1 423 (0.03)
13 946 (2.34)
15 369 (0.32)
Transport 
equipment**
  1 206  (  0.08)
13 728 (12.54)
14 934 (  0.91)
Fats (mainly 
for fodder)
  841 (0.36)
2 830 (6.06)
3 671 (1.30)
Machines
102 (0.00)
2 120 (0.32)
2 222 (0.05)
Total
53 752 (0.05)
56 875 (0.86)
110 627 (0.10)
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the percentage reduction in Norwegian export to the market in 
question. The calculations show the effects from elimination of tariffs and 50 % reductions in NTBs. 
*mostly seafood  ** including ships and oil rigs
Table 2. Reduction in Norwegian export due to trade deviation effects from TTIP 
(in USD 1000)
3  This is consistent with Fontagné et al. (2013), who find small diversion ef-
fects for third countries due to TTIP.
4  Note that CEPR (2013) uses different data for NTBs tariff equivalents than we 
do in our analysis in section 3.1.
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% change 
in GDP
Reductions in
Tariffs
Tariffs and NTBs
EU
IFO
0.2
4.95 
CEPR
0.10–0.11
0.27–0.48
IFO
  0.8
13.4
CEPR
0.04
0.21–0.39
IFO
0.0
-3.9
Note: Figures are based on CEPR (2013) and IFO (2013). IFO analyses effects for trade in goods and 
assumes a 100% reduction in tariffs together with effects from NTB reductions corresponding to 
that of existing FTAs. CEPR analyses effects for trade in goods and services and assumes 98–100% 
reduction in tariffs and 10–25% reductions in NTB tariff equivalents.
*Norway was not considered as a separate country in this study; reported effects are average effects 
for Norway, Australia, New Zeeland and Switzerland.
Table 3. Predicted percentage change in GDP due to TTIP
Cepr*
-0.3
0.08-0.19
USA Norway
Capaldo (2014) has criticised the above-mentioned studies for, 
among other things, not considering the costs of temporary and 
permanent increases in unemployment following from sector reallo-
cations under trade liberalisation. Using the United Nations Global 
Policy Model (GPM), he finds that TTIP would have a negative effect 
on GDP in several EU countries and a slight positive effect (0.36%) 
for the USA. For third countries, the effects are positive but very 
small (0.1%).  However, drawing separate conclusions for Norway 
would be very inaccurate, as the country is lumped together with 
many others in his study.
Although Capaldo draws attention to important adjustments costs 
following from FTAs, we doubt that the model applied is suitable for 
studying productivity gains from trade. Firstly, it operates with only 
three aggregated sectors. Hence, productivity gains following from 
sector reallocations (one of the main sources of gains from trade) are 
not likely to be taken properly into account. Secondly, the GPM is a 
macro-model, with behavioural rules or relationships between main 
variables estimated on the basis of earlier developments. In the 
baseline scenario (without TTIP), the model predicts a stark decline 
for the EU but gradual recovery for the USA (Cripps et al., 2010). 
According to the creators of this model, important policy changes 
should be reflected in changes in the behavioural rules (ibid., p. 15), 
and one cannot simply insert new data on some variable and run 
the model as a black box (ibid., p. 6). In parts of his simulations, 
Capaldo (2014) takes trade predictions from other studies on TTIP 
and plugs them into the GPM. His main results (ibid. sections 4.1 
and 4.2) are based on this. We must ask whether these results follow 
from unchanged behavioural rules. 
4. Effects from a separate agreement between Norway and USA
The diversion effects discussed in section 3.1 would be irreversible 
for Norwegian exports of most goods to the EU. Tariffs as well as 
many NTBs have already been eliminated, so Norway cannot regain 
conditions of competition by negotiating further reductions in barri-
ers to trade. Also for services export and investments, there are only 
limited possibilities for reversion of any diversion effects, since bar-
riers are already low. For seafood, however, the picture is different. 
The EU is an important market for Norway; and, even though the 
two have a separate agreement on seafood trade, Norway still faces 
EU tariffs on important products like salmon, herring and mackerel. 
If TTIP is realised, it may become even more important for Norway 
to obtain duty-free export of seafood to the EU. 
Since Norway faces MFN tariffs to the USA, any diversion effects 
there could be reversed if Norway in a separate agreement with the 
USA were granted the same tariff and NTB reductions as the EU. This 
could also boost Norwegian export of certain goods and services in 
addition to investments.
4.1. Reduced tariffs and NTBs for goods and services
Norway faces limited tariffs for its exports to the USA: the trade-
weighted average, including petroleum, is only 1%. However, exports 
beyond oil are dominated by price-sensitive goods like metals, min-
erals and fish, where price competition is tough and even low 
tariffs may bite. Melchior et al. (2009) simulates the potential 
for increased Norwegian goods export from tariff elimination for 
about 150 countries. They find that the USA comes in second, 
with a potential of USD 139 mill., equivalent to 1.6% of exports 
(2007 values). Although this is large compared to most other 
countries, it is not massive, because tariffs are low. However, the 
potential would be larger if also NTBs were reduced. In CEPR 
(2013), an ‘impact ranking’ shows the sectors with the greatest 
trade potential from tariff and NTB reductions. Replicating this 
calculation for Norway, we find that metals, chemicals and elec-
trical machinery top Norway’s ranking for goods, whereas mari-
time transport and business services are important for services.
 
In a world of multinationals, an important point may be that 
Norway is only a small, peripheral part of Europe. US multi-
nationals are likely to focus on exports to Europe more than 
to Norway specifically, and a substantial share of imports may 
be shipped indirectly, passing through trading intermediaries 
on the way. Comparing the value of goods shipped from USA 
to Norway with the value of goods imported from USA to Nor-
way (using US/Norwegian statistics, respectively), Medin and 
Melchior (2014) find that the value of goods increases by about 
40% on the way. This gap is considerable and probably larger 
than prevailing tariffs, NTBs and shipping costs. If some of this 
margin is a cost that may be eliminated by trade integration, 
that may add to the potential gains from integration.
For exports from USA to Norway, trade barriers are low for most 
goods. However, Norwegian agriculture is heavily protected by 
tariffs; and for some products of considerable interest to the 
USA, food standards (e.g. on GMO and hormones) are crucial 
and differ between Europe and the USA. If a trade agreement is 
to be negotiated between the USA and Norway, it is certain that 
the USA will demand considerable liberalisation, and this will 
be highly controversial in Norway.
4.2. Reduced barriers to FDI
Investments between Norway and the USA are large, and 
mutual sales of goods and services take place more through 
foreign affiliates than thorough trade. Matters that affect 
investments are therefore important, and a separate invest-
ments agreement between the two could reverse any diversion 
effects. In Table 5 we present estimated increases in three vari-
ables related to FDI from such an agreement. These estimates 
are highly uncertain and should be interpreted with caution. 
We assume that the level of barriers between Norway and the 
USA corresponds to that between the EU and the USA, which is 
fairly reasonable, as Norway, through the EEA Treaty, is part of 
the EU Single Market, with free movement of capital. We ana-
lyse the effect of reducing the barriers between Norway and the 
USA to the level of internal EU barriers. This may lead to an 
Table 4: Top export sectors in ‘impact ranking’ of the effect of trade liberalization 
with the USA
1
2
3
Motor vehicles
Chemical products
Processed food
Rank
Exports of goods to the USA
EU Norway
Other primary goods
Metals and metal products
Chemical products
Exports of services to the USA
1
2
3
Financial services
Insurance
Other business services
Business services
Other services
Maritime transports
Source: Authors’ calculations based on tariffs, NTB tariff equivalents, and price elasticities 
(from CEPR, 2013) and Norwegian trade in goods (from WITS/COMTRADE) and services (from 
Statistics Norway and the US Bureau of Economic Analysis) for year 2012.
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Table 5. Predicted effects from an investments agreement between Norway and USA
5. Conclusions
If realised, TTIP may have consequences for third countries like 
Norway. Here we have shown that the direct effects are moder-
ate: reductions in Norwegian exports due to trade diversion are 
small at the aggregate level, albeit large for certain sectors like 
seafood. We have further shown that a separate agreement with 
the USA might serve to reverse any deviation effects there, and 
boost exports of goods and services in addition to investments. 
TTIP might also have indirect consequences for third countries, 
by setting guidelines for future international trade negotiations. 
Furthermore, in Norway new rules and laws negotiated in TTIP 
may be applicable through the EEA Treaty. 
It is important for third countries like Norway to follow the TTTIP 
negotiations closely, undertake their own impact assessments, 
and consider how to respond to a potential agreement. However, 
it must not be forgotten that several other trade agreements 
are currently under negotiation, some of these covering much 
larger trade volumes than a TTIP would. One example is the 
RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) in the 
Asia-Pacific, which may cover goods trade more than three times 
larger than what would be covered under a TTIP. In addition, the 
importance of strong multilateral institutions for small countries 
like Norway should also be borne in mind.
FDI variables for Norway
Net income 
(in USD mill.)
3 431
858
25.0
209
184
33
Number 
of firms
528
87
16.5
182
19
10.5
Number of 
employees
40 560
6 043
14.9
18 068
1698
9.4
FDI
From the USA 
in Norway
From Norway 
in the USA
Level in year 2011
Predicted increase (level)
Predicted increase (%)
Level in year 2011
Predicted increase (level)
Predicted increase (%)
Note: The table shows estimated effects from a reduction in barriers for inward FDI 
(25% for the USA, 36% for Norway). 
Sources: predicted percentage changes: authors’ own calculations based on 
information on elasticities and NTB indices for FDI in CEPR (2013) pp. 92 and 93; 
level numbers: Statistics Norway (SSB), the figures cover only a sample of all firms.
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increase in Norwegian revenues from FDI in the USA of 15.7%, 
or USD 184 million. We would also expect a corresponding per-
centage increase in the number of US-owned firms in Norway 
and the number of employees in these.
